Utilizing new panel micro data on the ownership sequences of all types of borrowers from 1997-2012 leads to a reinterpretation of the U.S. foreclosure crisis as more of a prime, rather than a subprime, borrower issue. Moreover, traditional mortgage default factors associated with the economic cycle, such as negative equity, completely account for the foreclosure propensity of prime borrowers relative to all-cash owners, and for three-quarters of the analogous subprime gap. Housing traits, race, initial income, and speculators did not play a meaningful role, and initial leverage only accounts for a small variation in outcomes of prime and subprime borrowers.
I. Introduction
Most economic analysis of the recent American housing market bust and the subsequent default and foreclosure crises focuses on the role of the subprime mortgage sector. 1 Roughly three-quarters of the papers on the crisis reviewed in the next section use data only from the subprime sector and typically include outcomes from no later than 2008. For example, Mian & Sufi (2009) use mortgage defaults aggregated at the zip code level from 2005 to 2007 to conclude that a "salient feature of the mortgage default crisis is that it is concentrated in subprime ZIP codes throughout the country." However, subprime loans comprise a relatively small share of the complete housing market--about 15% in our data and never more than 21% in a given year. In addition, we document that most foreclosures in the United States occurred after 2008. These two issues raise questions about the representativeness of results based on selected subprime samples.
In this paper we provide new stylized facts about the foreclosure crisis and also empirically investigate different proposed explanations for why owners lost their homes during the last housing bust. We use micro data that track outcomes well past the beginning of the crisis and cover all types of house purchase financing -prime mortgages, Federal Housing Administration (FHA)/Veterans Administration (VA)-insured loans, loans from small or infrequent lenders, and all-cash buyers --not just the subprime sector. The data (described below in Section III)) contain information on over 33 million unique ownership sequences in just over 19 million distinct owner-occupied housing units in 96 metropolitan areas (MSAs) from 1997(1)-2012 (3), resulting in almost 800 million quarterly observations. It also includes information on up to three loans taken out at the time of home purchase, and all subsequent refinancing activity. Thus, we are able to create owner-specific panels with financing information from purchase through sale or other transfer of the home.
These data show that the crisis was not solely, or even primarily, a subprime sector event.
It started out that way, but quickly morphed into a much bigger and broader event dominated by prime borrowers losing their homes. Figure 1 reports the raw number of homes lost via foreclosure or short sale for the five different types of owners we track each year across all 96 metropolitan areas in our sample. There are only seven quarters, 2006(3)-2008(1) at the beginning of the housing market bust, in which there were more homes lost by subprime borrowers than by prime borrowers, although the gap is small as the figure illustrates. Over this time period, which is the focus of much of the previous literature in this area, 39,094 more subprime than prime borrowers lost their homes. This small difference was completely reversed by the beginning of 2009, as 40,630 more prime borrowers than subprime borrowers lost their homes just in the 2 nd , 3 rd , and 4 th quarters of 2008. An additional 656,003 more prime than subprime borrowers lost their homes from 2009(1)-2012 (3), so that twice as many prime borrowers lost their homes than did subprime borrowers over our full sample period.
One reason for this pattern is that the number of prime borrowers dwarfs that of subprime borrowers (and the other borrower/owner categories we consider). Table 1 lists the absolute number and share of all our borrower/owner categories over time. The prime borrower share varies around 60% over time and did not decline during the housing boom. Subprime borrower share nearly doubled during the boom, but only up to 21%. Subprime's increasing share came at the expense of the FHA/VA-insured sector, not the prime sector. This helps put Figure 2 's plot of foreclosure/short sale rates by borrower/owner type in proper perspective. Sharply higher subprime distress rates became evident early in the housing bust, just as the previous literature shows. 2 However, those high rates never affected anything close to a majority of the market. Moreover, loss rates among the much larger group of prime borrowers started to increase shortly thereafter-within a year. The jump in the foreclosure rate for prime owners become even more relevant empirically over time, as the market share of subprime borrowers dramatically declined after 2008 as shown in Table 1 .
After documenting basic facts about the housing bust, we turn to estimating panel data models of the probability of losing a home in foreclosure or via short-sale as a function of prime and subprime status and other factors. That our micro data allows us to create panels of full ownership sequences provides a potentially important advantage relative to earlier research that relied on loan-level data sets. Our ability to track borrowers/owners using different types of debt (such as subprime versus prime mortgages) over time means that we can also use our panel to estimate whether there are common factors that can explain foreclosure activity across mortgage labels. For example, we can measure negative equity conditions (i.e., when the current loan-tovalue (LTV) ratio is greater than one) for each quarter in each ownership sequence.
Current LTV is a powerful predictor of home loss, regardless of borrower type. This is consistent with the implications of a traditional home mortgage default literature which shows that negative equity changes an owner's incentive to keep current on one's loan (see Foster and Van Order (1984) , Kau, Kennan & Kim (1994) , and Deng, Quigley & Van Order (2000) , for example). 3 Controlling flexibly for current LTV almost fully explains the spike and continued elevated rate of foreclosures and short sales by prime borrowers during the housing bust. Thus, prime borrowers do not lose their homes at appreciably higher rates during the crisis than do all cash owners after controlling for negative equity. Because the incentives arising from the presence of negative equity do not vary by type of mortgage contract to a first approximation, traditional mortgage default models imply this variable should be influential in accounting for home losses in the subprime sector, too. That is what we find. Current LTV explains about three-quarters of all home losses among subprime borrowers on average, including about onehalf in the spike of the first year of the crisis.
The traditional mortgage default literature also posits a potentially important role for borrower illiquidity (typically thought of as arising from negative income shocks) in the decision to default, which is a precursor to losing one's home. 4 Because there are no large U.S. data sets with individual measures of on-going unemployment status, we are like the rest of the literature in being unable to test directly for this effect. 5 However, our data provide proxies for borrower 3 While we observe the precise date the owner lost her home to foreclosure or short sale, we cannot tell when the initial default occurred. There are industry rules of thumb that can be applied to impute the start of the distress sequence, but they vary by jurisdiction and over time. In any event, we are more interested in home loss, which is measured with accuracy in our data. 4 See Foote, et. al. (2010) for more on this 'double trigger' hypothesis. That terminology arises as follows. Negative equity is one trigger, but it is a necessary, not sufficient, condition for default. If the owner subsequently suffers a negative income shock that renders the household illiquid and unable to make monthly debt service payments in a timely manner, that is the second trigger which guarantees default because not even a sale of the property can pay off the outstanding balance when there is negative equity. 5 The Panel Survey on Income Dynamics (PSID) does provide information on the employment status of household members, but its samples are too small for our purposes. We also experimented with aggregate employment measures, but they had little or no impact on further reducing the gap between subprime and prime foreclosure rates. Large attenuation bias is to be expected when an aggregate measure is used to proxy for individual unemployment status (Gyourko and Tracy (2014) ). For example, if the local unemployment rate doubles from 5% to 10% in a illiquidity such as census tract-by-quarter indicators (that control for local economic conditions over time at the neighborhood level) or ownership indicators (that precisely control for individual conditions which are permanent, but have no time variation) in our specifications.
These proxies show an economically modest impact on the probability of losing one's home, but the role of negative equity remains very powerful. That said, it could be that our better measured LTV control is reflecting some of the impact related to unobserved individual income shocks.
For example, only 18% of our owners who ever experienced negative equity ended up losing their homes. 6 That is a large number, given that 40% of our ownership sequences had negative equity for at least one quarter. However, if only negative equity mattered, all of them presumably would have defaulted and ultimately lost their homes. While we remain agnostic on the precise strength of each of these two mechanisms, our results show that their combined effect is to eliminate almost entirely the empirical importance of the Prime and Subprime labels in explaining differential probabilities of foreclosure during the housing bust.
We also estimate whether a host of other 'initial conditions' affect the probability of home loss or weaken the impact of negative equity. These include owner demographics such as race, initial self-reported income and whether she is a speculator, housing unit traits such as the number of bedrooms and square footage of living space, and other financial factors such as initial LTV, whether there is a second loan or a refinancing, and the loan cohort. Neither borrower traits nor housing unit traits appear to have played a meaningful role in the foreclosure crisis.
Initial LTV has been shown to account for about 60% of the foreclosure crisis based on simulations of a macro model (Corbae and Quentin (2015) ), and Bayer, Ferreira and Ross (forthcoming) and Palmer (2014) find that the cohort of the most recent purchase or refinancing is influential in predicting defaults. However, our data reveal only modest impacts for these factors on whether owners ultimately lose their homes. We argue that these variables are best thought as helping measure current LTV more accurately.
While this study is focused on the foreclosure crisis, it obviously is related to a large literature on how the U.S. housing boom started and evolved. In other work, we document quarter, 90% of the labor force still is employed, so regressing whether an individual owners lost a home to foreclosure or engaged in a short sale on that aggregate variable is not likely to be statistically significant. 6 That is quite close to an independent estimate made by the firm CoreLogic which reported that 85% of owners in negative equity as of the second quarter of 2012 still were current on their mortgages (http://www.dsnews.com/articles/borrowers-in-negative-equity-slowly-declining-as-home-values-gain-report-2012-09-12). substantial variation in when housing booms began across metropolitan areas and show that the initial jumps in local prices tend to coincide with jumps in local area income (Ferreira and Gyourko (2013) ). Shiller (2005) and Case, Shiller and Thompson (2012) famously argued that the subsequent sharp increases in price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios were based on unrealistic expectations of house price growth. Soo (2015) uses local newspaper coverage to try to quantify those animal spirits, with DeFusco, et al. (2014) examining how heterogeneity in local market price increases might have generated spillover effects on price growth in nearby areas. The role of speculators in pushing up prices in certain markets has been analyzed by Chinco and Mayer (2014) and Haughwout , et al. (2011) . Mian and Sufi (2011) and Bhutta and Keys (2013) respectively study the roles of house prices and interest rates in increasing equity extraction during the housing boom and on future default rates. In addition to the host of research on the subprime sector discussed in the next section, there is a recent debate about changes in buyer composition during the run up of the housing boom (Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2015) ; Mian and Sufi (2015) ). We do not directly address a question related to this latter debate-namely, whether prime borrower foreclosures would have happened in the absence of the initial increase in subprime distress. We suspect the answer is 'yes', as Figure 1 shows a somewhat similar timing in the surge of foreclosures across borrower types. However, presenting a complete theory and empirical analysis that links the beginning of local housing booms, how they evolved, and their respective busts, all within the broader context of the economic cycle which included a global financial crisis, requires a separate analysis that is left to future research.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the related mortgage market literature focusing on the consequence of the bust. This is followed by a detailed description of our data in Section III. Section IV reports the empirical results. There is a brief conclusion.
II. Related Literature: Implications of the Focus on Subprime
Even though prime and subprime borrowers were losing their homes in roughly equal numbers as the crisis began ( Figure 1 ), because loss rates initially spiked so sharply among subprime borrowers ( Figure 2 ), researchers paid particular attention to that sector. Appendix Schuetz, Been and Ellen (2008) , and Whitaker and Fitzpatrick (2013) ) and macroeconomic effects of the housing boom and bust (e.g., Mian and Sufi (2011, 2014) Most of these studies also use data from a relatively short window of time (see column 5). The private label subprime mortgage-backed securities market did not really boom until late in the last housing cycle, so these data do not become nationally representative until the middle of the last decade. The vast majority of studies also do not use originations from later than 2008.
It is rare for borrower outcomes to be tracked past that year, too, which is two years prior to the peaking of prime borrower distress rates.
Geographic coverage is varied. Many studies use multi-state samples, and some have made considerable effort to control for differences in economic (and housing price) conditions across metropolitan areas. However, there has not yet been an extensive effort to control for detailed location effects within a metropolitan area.
While mostly limited to the subprime sector and the very beginning of the housing bust, these data have been useful in examining a host of interesting topics. Appendix Table 1 highlights that there have been a number of studies on special topics or features of the subprime market such as the impact of securitization on the all-on costs of origination, on lender screening incentives, and on incentives to renegotiate or work out distressed loans. There also have been separate studies on predatory lending and the prevalence and impact of untruthful data (e.g., 'liar loans'). This earlier research generally could not address the potential role of common factors across the prime and subprime sectors. That requires panels of complete ownership sequences combined with detailed financing information. It is to the creation of such data that we now turn.
III. Data Description
The home purchase and financing transactions files compiled by the data vendor
DataQuick are the foundation of the rich micro data used in this paper. They permit us to 10 The closest anybody comes to our goal of analyzing distress in the broader mortgage or housing market is Ascheberg, et. al. (2013) . It notes the rise borrower defaults as the housing bust unfolded, but takes a very different research approach from ours. Those authors construct a dynamic simulation model to impute the spillover effects of subprime defaults on prime defaults. observe sales transactions of single family units and homes in condominium or multi-unit structures. We also observe the financing associated with those purchases, as well as subsequent refinancings and subordinate mortgages. Our sample includes this information for the 96 metropolitan areas listed in the Appendix Table 2 , along with their start and end dates. As the appendix table notes, different metropolitan areas enter the sample at different times, some as early at 1993(1), so homes purchased before these dates do not enter our study sample (unless they are resold later). We report results based on data from 1997(1)-2012 (3) Because individual owners and all their financings can be tracked over time, we use these data to create a panel of individual ownership sequences. An ownership sequence is the complete span of time a unique owner owns a given residence. Our final panel contains 33,545,252 ownership sequences on 19,648,475 homes. There are just fewer than 780,000,000 quarterly observations on these ownership sequences from 1997(1)-on.
A. The Number and Types of Transactions
The predominant type of transaction is an arms-length purchase of an existing home.
These constitute 80.2% of all our home sales transactions. Arms-length sales of new homes from the builder (or other entity) to a household make up another 11.2% of all purchases. 12 The remaining sales observations are comprised of purchases out of foreclosure (8.6%). DataQuick does not code these as arms-length trades between two disinterested parties, but they are readily identifiable from another variable categorizing 'distress' transactions. 13 We also observe about 48 million financings not associated with a home purchase. These include refinancings and the taking on of junior debt. First, second and third loans at purchase are clearly identified. However, DataQuick does not identify whether a subsequent financing within a unique ownership sequence represents a refinancing of existing debt or the taking on of an additional loan. We adopt the following rule to distinguish between the two cases. If a new mortgage taken out subsequent to purchase has an initial loan balance that is more than 50% of the total mortgage balance taken out at purchase or is more than 50% of the imputed current price of the home, we assume the new loan is a refinancing that replaces the prior debt;
otherwise, it represents junior debt, which is added to the outstanding loan balance. Using this rule, we observe about 34 million refinancings and just over 14 million second loans.
B. Classifying Owners
Each ownership sequence is classified as one of five types based on the type of financing used by the owner. The most straightforward is those who buy their housing unit without using any debt. These are referred to as Cash owners in all tables and figures. They constitute a relatively stable 10%-11% share of our sample until 2010, after which their share increases to over 16% in 2012 (Table 1 ). If an owner purchases a house with no debt, but subsequently takes out a mortgage, that owner is no longer considered a Cash owner as of the quarter of the loan origination.
All other ownership sequences involve the use of some type of debt. We divide each of these owners into one of four groups of borrowers: (a) Prime; (b) Subprime; (c) FHA/VAinsured; or (d) 'Small'. Lender lists are used to define subprime mortgages because we do not have access to credit score micro data. More specifically, we define a borrower as subprime if it obtained its loan(s) from a lender on either the HUD or Inside Mortgage Finance lists, but the loan was not insured by FHA or VA. This group is called Subprime in all tables and figures. 14 As Figure 2 above and the data reported below show, our Subprime group has very high rates of home loss, which is consistent with the rest of the literature regardless of their data and procedure for distinguishing subprime from prime.
However, we do not categorize all other borrowers as Prime. Two other categories are included to help ensure we do not conflate subprime and prime owners. The first is comprised of borrowers whose loans were guaranteed by FHA or VA (regardless of lender identity). They are labeled FHA/VA owners in all tables and figures. 15 These loans often are considered of subprime quality because of the very high initial loan-to-value ratios usually involved, but we treat them separately from the 'private' subprime group. As shown above, the time series on their shares in our panel almost are the mirror images of one another.
We also distinguish another category of owners who were financed by individuals, households, or firms that issued less than 100 loans throughout our sample period. Our reasoning is that those owners who obtain financing from individuals or other entities that do not appear to be traditional banks and financial institutions could be riskier, and thus more subprimelike. We label them as 'Small' owners because they obtained their debt from entities that issued a very small number of loans. 16 Their temporal pattern of foreclosures/short sales is much more like that for Subprime than for Prime as shown above in Figure 2 . That said, they always constitute a small share of our sample, never amounting to more than 2%-3% of all observations in any one year.
14 The entities on the subprime lender list generally distinguish among the several units of a lender. For the HUD list in particular, identification was based on the HMDA identification number of the entity, and different subsidiaries of a large bank typically had different ID numbers. Thus, having a subsidiary of (say) Bank of America that HUD believes specializes in subprime lending on the list does not mean that all of Bank of America's mortgage issuance gets classified as subprime. Banks and subsidiaries also enter and leave the HUD list over time. The HUD list also ends in 2005. The Inside Mortgage Finance publication also lists specific units of some large financial institutions, but we also consider those units as subprime if they ever show up on that publication's list. 15 Ten metropolitan areas in the northeastern part of the country do not report data for this particular variable. They are Barnstable Town, MA, Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH, Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT, Harford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT, New Haven-Milford, CT, Pittsfield, MA, Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA, Springfield, MA, and Worcester, MA. We still include observations from these metropolitan areas in our regression analysis, but code this variable for them so that it is estimated separately from that for the other MSAs. Hence, coefficient estimates for this group of borrowers reported below in Table 3 are based on the 86 MSAs that have full information on FHA/VA loan status. 16 That said, some of these small lenders could arise from measurement error in the way DataQuick reports the names of lenders in the data. (1). Thus, the rough doubling of Subprime share over the same period is at the expense of the FHA/VA-insured sector, not the Prime sector (Table 1) .
C. Distress: Losing One's Home Via Foreclosure or Short Sale
We define distress as the home being lost to foreclosure or short sale. Foreclosed homes are explicitly identified in the DataQuick files by a distress code that indicates the exact date when the home was lost by the previous owner. We are able to confirm this by looking at the name of the new owner, which typically is some type of financial entity (e.g., bank, RMBS pool number, special servicer), not a household. We define a short sale as a transaction in which the sales price is no more than 90% of the outstanding balance on all existing debt. DataQuick has a variable that indicates when a sale is considered a short-sale, but our conversations with the company revealed that such information is based on a proprietary model. Our proxy for shortsales matches the DataQuick indicator 90% of the time. We use our version of short-sales because the DataQuick variable is only populated since 2004. Of the 2.971 million cases of owners losing their homes depicted in Figure 1 , two-thirds were due to foreclosure (2.071 million) with the rest (0.899 million being short sales). We report results below using only foreclosures that yield very similar findings.
D. Constant Quality House Prices
Constant quality nominal house price series are used throughout our analysis. We use hedonic price indexes, rather than repeat sales indexes popularized by Shiller (1987, 1989 ) because of their much less onerous data requirements. 17 This is relevant because we create semi-annual price indexes for groups of census tracts that are intended to proxy for neighborhoods within a metropolitan area. 18 There is significant variation in price growth over time across tract groups, and that heterogeneity is exploited when creating loan-to-value ratios for individual ownership panel sequences.
We do not include observations for which the reported sales price is less than $10,000 or greater than $5 million. Nominal price in logarithmic form for units in each neighborhood is modeled as a function of the square footage of the home entered in quadratic form, the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, and the age of the home. We also include a dummy for condominiums or houses located in subdivisions and interact these dummies with the linear and (1) to the cyclical peak across the 154 tract groups for which we estimated neighborhood-level hedonic price indexes in the Boston metropolitan area was 87.1%, with a standard deviation of 24.3 percentage points. The lowest neighborhood-level price growth to the peak was 48.6%, compared to 167.2% for the highest. There is less spatial heterogeneity in the bust, where the mean price decline from the peak to trough was 69.1%, with the spread from lowest to highest decline only 20 percentage points (from -61.1% to -82.6%). Naturally, this means that some submarkets in the Boston metro performed materially better than others since 2000(1). The mean price growth since 2000(1) was 45.8%, with the full range across neighborhoods running from 1.5% to 92.4%. This type of spatial heterogeneity is typical across tract groups within a given metropolitan area (larger ones in particular).
E. Leverage at Purchase and Over Time
Loan and purchase price data are combined to compute loan-to-value (LTV) ratios.
Doing so at purchase is straightforward: divide the sum of all mortgages taken out at purchase by the purchase price recorded by DataQuick. Figure 4 shows how initial LTV varies over time by the different types of borrowers/owners who used debt. FHA/VA-insured loans have much higher initial LTVs (close to 1) than both prime and subprime loans throughout our full sample period, and actually fell slightly over our sample period. Subprime borrower average initial LTVs did increase from about 81% to 85% as the boom built in the mid-2000s. There is a more modest increase in Prime borrower initial LTVs over the same time period. Thus, there was not a dramatic surge in initial leverage ratios for the typical borrower in any sector of the mortgage market while the long boom in house prices built.
Current LTV by quarter must be estimated. Fortunately, in addition to having panels of ownership sequences that make its estimation feasible, two features of our data allow for a more accurate estimation than exists in other research: (a) the complete history of home financings, including refinancings and second loans; and (b) neighborhood-level house price indexes. 19 In imputing the numerator, we presume that all new debt taken on is fully amortizing, 30-year, fixed rate product. This is a conservative assumption that almost certainly leads us to understate true LTV, particularly on subprime product which the literature suggests more often involved adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and terms that did not require immediate amortization of principal. To impute current house value in the denominator, we start with house price at purchase, and update it on a half-year basis using our neighborhood-level price indexes. Noise in the denominator can arise in different ways. For example, values for distressed properties are likely to be overstated because they probably were receiving lesser maintenance and repairrelated investment. This provides another reason why current LTV could be underestimated.
However, we suspect that variation provided by refinancings, second loans and the local price index likely overshadow the measurement error due to this factor.
Leverage ratios at purchase may not have spiked during the run-up in prices as the boom built, but Figure 5 shows The average current LTV for prime borrowers was just above 1.0 in the first quarter of 2009, while that for Subprime and FHA/VA borrowers was above 1.2. The average Prime owner continued to have no equity in its home for the three following years, while that for all other owner types with debt remained in negative equity.
F. Identifying Speculators
Researchers and popular commentators have argued that speculators may have played an important role in the building of the last housing boom, thereby helping make its ultimate demise worse (e.g., Haughwout, et. al. (2011) ; Chinco and Mayer (2014) ). We identify speculators in one of two ways. First, we follow Chinco and Mayer (2014) who reasoned that since speculators would not be living in the purchased unit, they would have their tax bills sent to another address.
We compare the precise street address of the housing unit with the address to which the tax bill is sent -the 'Tax Address' in the DataQuick files. Whenever the two are appreciably different, we call that purchaser a speculator. 20 The second way we identify whether a purchaser is a speculator is by whether the buyer has a name that is a business. This includes corporate or commercial names that include LLC or INC in them, homebuilders, or trusts (especially mortgage-backed securities trusts which are typically identified by a four-digit number in their names). 21 Appendix Figure 1 shows that the share of speculators by type of borrower increases for all categories until 2002, but then remains stable for Prime, Subprime, and FHA/VA borrower/owners, while it keeps escalating for Cash owners and Small borrowers.
G. Demographics and Income of Borrowers
A weakness of the DataQuick files is that they do not contain any information on the owners beyond their names. To gain more insight into borrower demographic characteristics (race and gender of the head of the household) and the self-reported income levels, we match individual sales transactions to loan application data in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) files. Observations are merged as follows. In the first step, each transaction was matched to a loan using the year in which the transaction occurred, the full 11 digit Census tract number, the lender name, and the exact loan amount. In cases where there were multiple matches, one of them was randomly assigned as being a true match while the rest were considered unmatched. The remaining unmatched observations were then merged based only on
year, Census tract and exact loan amount with multiple matches being randomly assigned as in the first step. This two-step process was repeated several times allowing for the loan amounts to differ from each other in increments of $1,000 up to a total allowable difference of $10,000.
Any observations remaining after this process then went through an identical matching procedure using 9 digit Census tract numbers. Observations surviving that procedure are considered to be unmatched. In total, 92.7% of the sales transactions in DataQuick were matched at some point in the procedure. Of those, approximately 60% were matched in the first step. Because we are unsure about the quality of the matches in subsequent steps, in the empirical work below we always distinguish the demographics in two groups -perfect and imperfect matches -and include both in the estimation. Reported regression coefficients are for the perfect matches only.
Finally, the demographic data for Cash buyers is missing by definition because they never took out a loan, and hence, cannot be matched with any HMDA observation. Table 2 reports summary statistics for a number of variables of interest in our empirical work for the full sample and also for each of the five owner categories, with their shares in our overall sample in parentheses: Prime (61%), Subprime (15%), FHA/VA (10%), Cash (11%), and Small (2%). The top panel notes distress rates. Foreclosures always are at least twice as prevalent as short sales in leading to the loss of a home. And, the unconditional probability of a Subprime owner losing its home is well more than double the rate a Prime owner does. The sample-wide mean is 0.73% for Subprime owners (1-in-137) versus only 0.34% (1-in-294) for Prime owners, but Figure 2 above shows that masks substantial heterogeneity over time. The group of owners that borrowed from 'small' lenders has a distress rate of 0.42%, above that for Prime owners, but well below that for Subprime owners. The same is true of borrowers using FHA/VA-insured mortgages, who have a distress rate of 0.38%. Not surprisingly, all cash owners have the lowest rate of home loss at 0.14% or 1-in-714. By definition, these owners cannot lose their homes to lenders. Examination of the names of the parties taking over these homes in foreclosure indicates that it is property taxes that are not being paid for the most part, as a local taxing authority or municipality often takes ownership. of Subprime owners is 10 percentage points below that of Prime owners, at 63% versus 73%.
H. Summary Statistics
The FHA/VA-insured category has a similarly low White share. Reported income on the loan application recorded in the HMDA files shows Subprime owners to be less rich than Prime owners, but the difference is only 6%. There were many claims about misstatements on 'liar loans' in the subprime sector, so this modest difference may reflect some of that misreporting.
Note that FHA/VA-insured borrowers, who are required to provide documentation about their earnings, have appreciably lower incomes on average. Panel 3 also reports aggregate data on speculators. One-quarter of all ownership sequences are classified as speculators, and they are more prevalent among the all Cash owner group at 61%.
The fourth panel reports summary statistics on house prices and LTV at the time of purchase. Transaction prices are higher and similar for both prime and subprime borrowers, and smaller for owners who took FHA/VA-insured loans. However, subprime owners are more likely to use high leverage than prime owners at purchase. But by no means are Subprime owners the most leveraged owners in our sample. Borrowers of FHA/VA loans tend to use much more debt at purchase. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of them have 95%-100% LTVs at origination, and another 23% have no equity at purchase. 23
The fifth panel of Table 2 breaks down the financings by whether they are for a purchase or any subsequent financing. For the overall sample, 51% of all ownership sequences never altered the debt they took on at purchase (see column 1). Another one-third (34%) refinanced and another 15% took out a second mortgage. Across owner types, the Subprime group was the least likely to not refinance or take on a second mortgage. Finally, the last panel shows averages for current LTV, which has been discussed above and in Figure 5 .
IV. Empirical Results

A. Panel Structure Estimates: Negative Equity and Borrower Illiquidity
We estimate various panel specifications, where the dependent variable is a binary distress outcome y ht which equals one if the owner lost the home via foreclosure or short sale that quarter and equals zero otherwise, and it is indexed by housing ownership sequence h and yearquarter t. We always control for the different type of borrowers/owners (O k ): Prime, Subprime, FHA/VA, Small and Cash, with Cash being the omitted category in all reported results. A given owner is classified as one (and only one) of these types each quarter, with k indexing the five ownership types. 24 We first investigate the importance of the two key factors suggested by the traditional home mortgage default literature: negative equity and borrower illiquidity. Negative equity is directly measured for each housing unit each quarter by the current LTV variable discussed in the previous section. Current LTV enters the model split into two dozen intervals (denoted by the vector D ht ), typically of 10 percentage points in terms of leverage (i.e., from 30-39% LTV, 40-49%, etc.) in order to see whether entering negative equity status or being more and more underwater increases the probability of losing one's home. Because there is no large micro data source that tracks homeowner-level employment status, we proxy for the presence of a negative income shock that would render a household illiquid by including census tract-by-quarter fixed effects (denoted S tn in the model below) that allow us to capture very local (but still not household-specific) economic conditions in each quarter t. There are nearly 1.6 million of these dummy variables. Given the extremely large number of observations, this does not pose a statistical problem. Rather, the primary challenge is computational, which is why we estimate linear probability models of the following type:
(1) y ht = α k O htk + S tn + ρD ht + μ ht , where μ ht is the standard error term. Estimates are clustered at the census tract level. 24 Classification is straightforward for any quarter in which an owner has no more than one mortgage. If there are multiple loans and at least two have different classifications, we use the following order to determine owner type: Subprime, FHA/VA, Prime, and Small. Thus, if the owner has at least one Subprime loan and any number of other types of loans, it is classified as Subprime. If it does not have any subprime loans, but has at least one FHA/VAinsured loan and any other loans, it is classified as FHA/VA, and so forth. Table 3 reports results. The first column only includes the financing type dummies with no other covariates. Recall that Cash owners always are the omitted category, so that the estimated coefficients must be interpreted as relative to the 0.14% home loss rate for that group of owners (see the means in the top panel of Table 2 ). These baseline results confirm that Prime borrowers lose their homes at less than half the rate at which Subprime borrowers do. Subprime loss rates are larger than the other owner categories, too, which tend to be more similar to that for Prime owners. Hence, those we identify as Subprime borrowers certainly do look riskier unconditionally than the other groups of owners.
Including the census tract-by-quarter fixed effects vector in the second specification means that Prime versus Subprime loss rates are now being made for ownership sequences in the same neighborhood that faced similar average local economic shocks. Those results show increases in the Prime and Subprime coefficients of roughly the same magnitude. This means the Prime -Subprime gap in home loss rates largely is unaffected by these controls. 25 This suggests that Subprime and Prime owners are dispersed across tracts within a metropolitan area rather than spatially concentrated in a select few. Hence, we can rule out a dense spatial concentration of subprime loans in select neighborhoods that experienced some type of strong negative economic shock as explaining why subprime distress rates were so high. 26 The results in the next column (#3) show that current LTV is much more influential. The point estimates on each ownership category fall substantially. All but the Subprime borrowers are no longer appreciably more at risk of losing their homes via foreclosure or short sale than are all Cash owners. The Prime owners' coefficient is negative (as is that for FHA/VA borrowers), indicating that once current LTV is controlled for, they are less likely to lose their homes than all Cash owners. The difference is quite small in absolute terms, but it is not unexpected or illogical. Prime borrowers should be very good credit risks, and they do not include as many speculators as the Cash owner group does. And, the 'distress gap' between Subprime and all Cash owners also falls by about three-quarters. 25 The Prime/Subprime gap narrows by only 4%. 26 The first column of Appendix It is noteworthy that these results are robust to a couple of important alternative specifications. First, the findings are not much altered if we restrict the measure of home loss to foreclosures only. In that case, the coefficients on the Prime, Subprime, FHA/VA, and Small categories of borrowers/owners are -0.00088, 0.00121, -0.00126, and 0.00008, respectively.
Thus, it is negative equity, not any distinction between foreclosures and short sales that is driving the findings. We also estimated specifications adding lagged values of Current LTV to the specification in column 3 of Table 3 . In that case, the coefficients on Prime, Subprime, FHA/VA and Small become -0.00097, 0.00173, -0.00205, and -0.00078, respectively. The similarity in results is not surprising, as it is not obvious that LTV at the time of initial delinquency is more relevant than LTV at the time of foreclosure. Non-strategic defaulters only go through foreclosure if they cannot sell for more than the outstanding mortgage balance when they actually lose the home. Even strategic defaulters that first miss a payment because they know they will give up the house ultimately might care more about LTV in the future. Figure 6 plots each individual current LTV interval estimate for specification 3 of Table   3 . As expected, increasing leverage from very low levels has little or no impact on the probability of losing one's home until negative equity is approached. Loss rates continue to increase the deeper underwater the owner becomes. For example, the impact of being from 30-40% underwater (current LTV bin of 1.3-1.4) is ten times larger than that of being barely above water (current LTV bin of 0.9-1.0). At 1.1%, it is very large economically, too, given the low average loss rates reported in Table 2 . Even so, the probability of losing the home doubles again by the time one has a current LTV of 1.8-1.9, and goes above 3% in absolute value for the most highly leveraged owners. 27 This indicates that a large fraction of the distress in residential real estate markets, regardless of the type of mortgage finance, was concentrated among borrowers living in homes that were underwater. 28
This large average impact is not being driven solely by the subprime sector, as shown in Appendix Figure 2 . This plot, which is based on a specification that interacts our current LTV variable with borrower/owner type shows that a given amount of leverage is associated with a higher probability of home loss for a Subprime versus a Prime borrower. However, the shapes of 27 Unconditionally, 30% of all owners who ever experienced a current LTV>2.0 subsequently lost their homes. That is 1.67 times the 18% share among those who ever experienced negative equity. 28 The plot in Figure 6 looks very similar when other covariates are added ranging from household features to other components of leverage discussed below. This suggests that our negative equity variable both is well measured and that its effects on foreclosures and short sales are unlikely to be due to omitted factors. the plots are similar and the impact of being underwater on Prime borrowers is very large relative to the average probability of foreclosure or short sale in that sector of the market. Figure 7 documents heterogeneity in the Prime and Subprime effects over time, and in doing so, highlights how powerful negative equity is in accounting for homeowner distress after the global financial crisis began. These plots are from augmented versions of the first three specifications reported in Table 3 Following that, Subprime sector foreclosures are about three-quarters lower once the owner's negative equity position is controlled for (right panel). Third, prior to the global financial crisis, borrowers in the Prime and Subprime sector were no more likely to lose their homes than all Cash owners once we know their current LTV ratio. This is not unexpected, as sound underwriting should lead to groups of non-speculator owner-occupiers who are good credit risks.
What is striking is that this remains true for Prime borrowers throughout the housing bust period.
Given that the vast majority of foreclosures occurred in that sector from 2009-on, this suggests the crisis was largely one of sound borrowers falling into negative equity because of very large declines in house prices. Robustness tests reported below will confirm that initial conditions such as purchase quarter LTV and loan cohort effects do not change this conclusion. We know from Figure 7 that negative equity and other variables can account for no more than one-half of that initial jump. It turns out that this surge is associated with a spatially concentrated group of markets in central California. For example, the top ten metropolitan areas in terms of loss rates among subprime borrowers/owners in 2006 (3) AZ, and small Florida markets join the top ten list. Thus, the initial increase in the subprime sector distress was driven by an array of central California markets in a way that only partially can be accounted for by our measure of current LTV.
B. Panel Structure Estimates: Other Potential Factors
The popular press and much of the previous scholarly literature have also focused on other factors to explain the foreclosure crisis. Nonacademic commentators often wrote about homeowners stretching to buy bigger and better homes during the boom in a 'keeping up with 29 The two in the Subprime top ten list not in the Prime top ten are Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI, and Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN. The two in Subprime list not in the Prime top ten are Baltimore-Towson, MD, and Yakima, WA. Hence, all 22 MSAs are industrial markets in economic decline.
the Jones's' mentality. 30 It is true that the size of the typical new home rose substantially during the boom 31 , but typical unit size is similar across borrower types except for the FHA/VA group, who bought smaller homes on average (panel 2, Table 2 ). The findings reported in column 4 of Table 3 show that adding housing units traits including the square footage of living area (in quadratic form), the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, and age of the unit to the specification with census tract-by-quarter fixed effects does not change the coefficient on the borrower/owner category variables virtually at all, much less to the extent that adding current LTV did. Adding it to the third specification that also includes current LTV does not alter any of our aforementioned conclusions either. Nor do these variables have an economically large independent impact on the probability of home loss.
Next we look at household traits, which include the race and gender of the owner, the self-reported initial income of the owner and our imputation for whether the owner is a speculator. These variables could impact foreclosures in a number of ways. Race, for example, could be important since minorities have a larger share of subprime mortgages relative to prime (panel 3, Table 2 ), and usually have less wealth than non-minorities (Bayer, Ferreira, Ross, forthcoming) . Speculators could react faster to the first sign of negative equity and stop making monthly payments early in order to avoid future bigger losses. One quarter of our owners are categorized as speculators, but there is only a small difference in their share of the Prime and Subprime groups (panel 3, Table 2 ). Low self-reported income could indicate a lower likelihood to sustain mortgage payments in the future. These are all plausible mechanisms, but adding these household traits to the specification including census tract-by-quarter fixed effects is barely more impactful than adding housing unit traits was (column 5, homes less frequently than Blacks as expected (ceteris paribus), but the absolute magnitudes of their impacts are relatively small and they are virtually uncorrelated with borrower type. [The racial/ethnic group with the highest rate of home loss is Hispanics.] Female heads are more likely to lose their homes than are male heads, but once again, this outcome is not strongly correlated with borrower type. The economic impact of self-reported initial income is quite modest in size, but this could be due at least partially to the variable being noisy. Speculators do lose their homes at slightly higher rates than non-speculators, but the coefficient is relatively small (0.00019) and does not change the relative impacts across borrower types.
The next three columns of Table 3 investigate whether other measures of leverage that influence current LTV can explain the foreclosure probabilities. The first component is initial LTV, which mechanically corresponds to the first current LTV observation in any ownership sequence. We look at this variable individually because recent work by Corbae and Quintin (2015) concludes that about 60% of the foreclosure crisis can be explained by higher initial LTV based on simulations of a macro model of housing markets they developed. This variable is transformed into five intervals for estimation purposes: 0.0-0.8, 0.8-0.9, 0.9-0.95, 0.95-1.0, and 1.0+. The regression results reported in column 6 show that initial leverage is more influential than the housing units and household trait vectors, but its impact is substantially less than that of current LTV for all but the FHA/VA-insured borrower groups. The extremely strong impact on this category of borrowers probably is due to their extremely high initial leverage being the salient fact about them. Controlling for initial leverage does account for over half the gap in the rate of home loss for Prime borrowers relative to all Cash owners (i.e., the relevant coefficient falls by 55% from 0.00329 in column 2 to 0.00147 in column 6), but that is far from fully accounting for the Prime -Cash gap, which current LTV does. Controlling for initial LTV yields a Subprime sector coefficient that is three times larger than when current LTV is controlled for (contrast column 3 versus column 6).
Column 7 then separately controls for whether refinancing a prior lien or taking on a second loan can account for foreclosure/short sale outcomes. Either change can directly contribute to variation in current LTV by discretely altering the mortgage balance during an ownership sequence. We know from Table 2 (columns 1 and 2, fifth panel) that nearly one-half of all ownership sequences in our sample contained a refinancing or second mortgage, and that this share was even higher among Subprime borrowers (columns 5 and 6, fifth panel). That this could prove important is suggested by Mian and Sufi's (2011) conclusion that home equitybased borrowing may explain one-third of mortgage defaults between 2006 and 2008. However, our findings imply no material economic role for this factor in accounting for foreclosure and short sales outcomes across different types of borrowers. In absolute terms, the loss rates from foreclosures or short sales for all types of borrowers are slightly higher, not lower, relative to all Cash owners if there is a refinancing or junior lien (compare with column 2). This could be due to positive selection in the sense that it was the better credit risks that were able to refinance and/or take on a second loan. Relatively speaking, the gap between outcomes for Prime versus Subprime borrowers also is changed only slightly, presumably because both types of borrowers refinanced a lot. In any event, there is no evidence that foreclosures or short sales can be accounted for by refinancing or second loans in general or in the subprime sector specifically.
The next column reports results for testing whether cohort dummies based on the quarter of the last purchase or mortgage transaction within an ownership sequence impact the probability of foreclosure or short sale. These cohorts affect current LTV because houses bought or refinanced near the peak of the housing boom had the largest declines in prices after the beginning of the recession, and therefore suffered the largest increases in current LTV. As shown above in Figure 3 , these cohort effects may be quite relevant in MSAs where all neighborhood prices moved in sync with the rest of the market during the housing boom. Also, Bayer, Ferreira, and Ross (forthcoming) and Palmer (2014) report that cohort effects may explain some of the movements in defaults and prices respectively. Their impacts tend to be slightly less influential than those for initial LTV (compare column 8 with column 6), and thus
are not a substitute for the impact of negative equity conditions as reflected in our current LTV control.
Column 9 includes all loan trait variables-initial LTV, whether there was a refinance or 2 nd mortgage, and origination cohort. The results indicate that the latter two variables have some influence independent of initial LTV (compare to column 6), but the combination still is not as impactful as controlling for current LTV (column 3). 32 32 Computational constraints arising from estimating standard errors clustered at the census tract level required using a 50% random subsample (of each MSA) for this specification. The point estimates reported are not materially different from those arising from using the full sample, but not clustering. See the notes to Table 3 .
Column 10 then includes current LTV and all other loan traits. 33 The pattern of results is similar to that for current LTV in column 3. Outcomes for Prime borrowers, who suffer the most losses of their homes to foreclosure and short sale, are virtually indistinguishable from those for all Cash owners. The gap between Subprime borrowers and all Cash owners remains positive, and is actually larger than when only current LTV is controlled for. As before, FHA/VA-insured borrowers do not lose their homes at higher rates once one controls for current or initial LTV, and small borrowers still are slightly more likely to lose their homes, but negative equity reduced that gap substantially. Finally, the estimated coefficients for the underlying negative equity controls are only 10-20% lower in this specification than in column 3, while the estimated coefficients for initial LTV are 50-70% lower when compared to the respective estimates in column 6. 34 In sum, controlling for current LTV accounts for virtually all of the increase in foreclosures among Prime borrowers and a substantial fraction of the surge in Subprime home losses. Other variables that help predict current LTV are useful, but they reasonably can be interpreted as reducing the noise in our measure of negative equity at the individual homeowner level. As noted above, it is true that current LTV, which is measured at the household level, could proxy for micro-level borrower illiquidity conditions that our census tract-by-quarter fixed effects may not capture well for the reasons outlined in Gyourko and Tracy (2014) . Much better, micro-level data on employment status, is necessary to provide a convincing test of the impact of desirability to pay (negative equity) versus ability to pay (unemployment). We did experiment with specifications that included ownership-specific fixed effects and quarter dummies (as opposed to the neighborhood-by-quarter fixed effects) to try to get around this problem, but these specifications also show a limited role for this type of permanent individual level factor. 35
V. Conclusion
The housing bust and its consequences are among the defining economic events of the past quarter century. Constructing and analyzing new and very large micro data spanning the cycle and all sectors of the mortgage market leads us to reinterpret the ensuing foreclosure crisis as something much more than a subprime sector issue. Many more homes were lost by prime mortgage borrowers, and their loss rates not only increased relatively early in the crisis, but stayed high through 2012. This new characterization of the crisis motivates a very different empirical strategy from previous research on this topic. Rather than focus solely on the subprime sector and subprime traits, we turn to the traditional home mortgage default literature that explains outcomes in terms of common factors such as negative equity and borrower illiquidity.
The key empirical finding is that negative equity conditions can explain virtually all of the difference in foreclosure and short sale outcomes of Prime borrowers compared to all Cash owners. This is true on average, over time (including the spike in their foreclosure rate cycle itself plays a large role. That is the implication of our finding that large numbers of Prime borrowers who did not start out with extremely high LTVs still lost their homes to foreclosure.
In that context, effective regulation is not just a matter of restricting certain exotic subprime contracts associated with extremely high default rates. We do not have detailed loan trait data, but it turns out that we do not need it to account for much of the difference in the propensity to lose one's home across prime and subprime mortgage borrowers.
Our findings also can help inform homeowner bailout policy. We are not able to provide a definitive recommendation one way or another, but we can rule out one noteworthy reason offered for not aiding homeowners-namely, that the crisis was mostly about irresponsible subprime sector actors (both lenders and borrowers) who were undeserving of transfers. Of course, this is not to say that there was no such behavior. The evidence from other research and serious journalists is that there was. However, it is clear from the passage of time (and the accumulation and analysis of new data that provides) that the problem was much more widespread and systemic. That is the meaning of a common factor playing such an influential role in determining foreclosure losses across all types of borrowers. That knowledge may or may not have affected policy makers' and the public's perspectives on bailouts. What we do know is that significant distress in the housing market which dramatically weakened household sector balance sheets had very large negative macroeconomic effects (Mian and Sufi (2014) ).
In terms of research needed to make progress in understanding this past housing bust, and perhaps more importantly, the next one to come, there is one area in urgent need of more work:
combining micro-level labor market data with housing data. That will allow for stronger tests of the impact of borrower illiquidity on defaults and foreclosures. This likely will take much effort and a change in policy among government data collectors, but it is a useful goal. 
